

## Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY MANILA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2062

INFO CINCPAC

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 5 MANILA 10457

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, RP

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF US SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

FOR FY 1979: THE PHILIPPINES

REF: (A) STATE 133136, (B) MANILA 10208

1. SUMMARY: THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS US SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO BE TACIT COMPENSATION FOR RENT-FREE USE OF CLARK AND SUBIC. UNWILLINGNESS ON OUR PART TO MEET AT LEAST SOME OF PHILIPPINE REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE COULD MAKE MAINTENANCE OF US MILITARY BASES HERE UNTENABLE, UNLESS WE WERE TO PROVIDE ALTERNATE COMPENSATION. THIS SIGNIFICANT FACTOR ASIDE, WE SEE NO OVERRIDING US INTEREST SERVED BY CONTINUED SECURITY ASSISTANCE. MORE DESIRABLE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO PHASE OUT MILITARY GRANT AID AND PROVIDE SOME COMPENSATORY PACKAGE FOR THE BASES. ONLY MAJOR SECURITY PROBLEMS CONFRONTING GOP ARE INTERNAL, NAMELY THE MUSLIM AND COMMUNIST INSURGENCIES. GOP IS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT CHINESE AND VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS TOWARD THE DISPUTED SPRATLEY ISLAND GROUP, WHICH THE GOP CLAIMS. NON-PURSUIT OF PHILIPPINE CLAIM TO SPRATLEYS PROBABLY DESIRABLE FROM US POINT OF VIEW.

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PHILIPPINE ARMED FORCES ARE APPROPRIATE TO MEET INTERNAL SUBVERSION THREAT. NONE OF ITEMS AFP PLANS ACQUIRE FY 79 ARE SOPHISTICATED. IF US DOES NOT PROVIDE ITEMS, AFP PROBABLY COULD AND WOULD ACQUIRE SIMILAR ITEMS FROM THIRD COUNTRIES. WE SEE MINIMAL ARMS CONTROL IMPACT OF ARMS TRANSFERS TO GOP AND LIMITED PROSPECTS FOR ENLISTING GOP SUPPORT FOR ARMS RESTRAINT. WE DOUBT US SECURITY ASSISTANCE

HAS SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON PHILIPPINE ECONOMY. GOP HAS MADE SIGNIFICANT EFFORT TO IMPROVE FOREIGN PERCEPTION OF ITS HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, AND APPROVAL OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE REQUESTS WOULD PERHAPS REINFORCE GOP'S DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE IMPROVING SITUATION, ON THE OTHER HAND, DENIAL OF SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD NOT NECESSARILY RESULT IN DIMINUTION OF EFFORT SINCE OTHER FACTORS ALSO INVOLVED. EMBASSY IS ON RECORD AS FAVORING EXPANDED MILITARY TRAINING, ALTHOUGH SOME IN EMBASSY OPPOSE THIS. END SUMMARY.

2. THE FOLLOWING RESPONSES ARE KEYED TO QUESTIONS POSED REFTEL:

3. OUR LONG-TERM INTERESTS IN THE PHILIPPINES, AS OUTLINED IN MANILA 3128, ARE A) US STRATEGIC DEFENSE NEEDS AND MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, B) PHILIPPINE ACHIEVEMENT OF RAPID ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, C) PROTECTION OF US INVESTMENTS AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF ADDITIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT, AND D) CONTROLLED REDUCTION OF THE OUTMODED "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS" BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND THE US. SECURITY ASSISTANCE IS RELATED TO US STRATEGIC DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS SINCE GOP CONSIDERS IT TO BE TACIT COMPENSATION FOR RENT-FREE USE OF CLARK AND SUBIC. AN ABRUPT TERMINATION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO THE PHILIPPINES WITHOUT SOME COMPENSATORY PACKAGE, SUCH AS A CAST RENTAL/ECONOMIC AID MIX, COULD MAKE OUR CONTINUED CONFIDENTIAL

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USE OF CLARK AND SUBIC UNTENABLE. THIS SIGNIFICANT FACTOR ASIDE, WE SEE NO OVERRIDING US INTEREST SERVED BY MAINTAINING A SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PHILIPPINES. UNLESS A NEW BASES AGREEMENT DICTATES OTHERWISE, WE SHOULD CONTEMPLATE THE GRADUAL PHASE-OUT OF MILITARY AID OTHER THAN TRAINING, BEARING IN MIND THAT THERE IS NO CREDIBLE EXTERNAL THREAT TO PHILIPPINES AT PRESENT OR IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. THERE ARE NO COMPELLING SECURITY REASONS, INCLUDING THE MAINTENANCE OF THE BASES, WHY WE SHOULD SEEK THROUGH MAP TO BUILD THE STRENGTH OF THE AFP. AN ARSENAL OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS WOULD ONLY DIVERT RESOURCES FROM PHILIPPINE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND COULD ENCOURAGE GOP ADVENTURISM IN DISPUTED AREA OF SOUTH CHINA SEA. IN THIS CONTEXT, EVEN CERTAIN US MILITARY SALES MAY BE HARMFUL TO OUR OWN LONG-RANGE INTERESTS. ANY PERMANENT WINDING DOWN OF THE MINDANAO INSURGENCY WOULD FURTHER REDUCE THE

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JUSTIFICATION FOR MILITARY AID. MOREOVER, OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAM HELPS TO PERPETUATE THE ANACHRONISTIC RP-US "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP", WHICH IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO REDUCE IN A CONTROLLED FASHION.

IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FOREGOING, WE SEE AS ESSENTIALLY MARGINAL THE OBJECTIVES OF OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM A) TO MEET THE GOP'S LEGITIMATE REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE IN MODERNIZING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) WHILE DEFLECTING THOSE REQUESTS WHICH ARE FRIVOLOUS OR INVOLVE EQUIPMENT TOO SOPHISTICATED FOR THE AFP, B) TO PROMOTE AFP SELF-RELIANCE, AND C) TO PROMOTE EQUIPMENT COMMONALITY, BOTH INTERNALLY AND REGIONALLY, IN ORDER TO ENHANCE MATERIAL COMPATIBILITY WHERE APPROPRIATE.

4. A. THE GOP IS BENEFICIARY OF A NOW GENERALLY BENIGN SECURITY SITUATION IN THE REGION. THE END OF THE VIETNAM WAR AND THE EXISTING GREAT POWER EQUILIBRIUM HAVE REDUCED IF NOT ELIMINATED EXTERNAL THREATS, PERCEIVED AND REAL. LIKE MOST OTHER LEADERS OF ASEAN, PRESIDENT MARCOS PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE ONLY MAJOR SECURITY PROBLEM CONFRONTING THE NATION IS SUBVERSION,  
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PRINCIPALLY THE MUSLIM REBELLION IN MINDANAO AND THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY, AND THAT THE ONLY LASTING ANTI-DOPE IS DEVELOPMENT. ABOUT THREE-FOURTHS OF THE AFP COMBAT STRENGTH HAS BEEN DEPLOYED IN MINDANAO. AT SAME

TIME, GOP HAS BEEN WAGING A DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE TO LESSEN MIDDLE EASTERN SYMPATHY FOR MUSLIM REBELS, AND THE IMPLIED THREAT TO PHILIPPINE OIL SUPPLIES. THE GOP LAST YEAR INVITED LIBYA, PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL BACKER OF THE MUSLIM REBELS, TO MEDIATE IN THE CONFLICT, AND ALTHOUGH NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BROKEN DOWN, A REASONABLY EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE HAS EXISTED SINCE JANUARY 1977. GOP ALSO HAS MADE ASEAN THE KEYSTONE OF ITS REGIONAL RELATIONS AND HAS SOUGHT TO DISSUADE ITS MUSLIM NEIGHBORS, INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA, FROM ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT BY EMPHASIZING REGIONAL COOPERATION.

IN CONTRAST, THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IS BEING CONTAINED WITH LITTLE MORE THAN LOCAL POLICE FORCES. THE AFP IS WAGING A FITFUL COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN USING FAIRLY STANDARD TACTICS.

MARCOS DOES NOT SEEM UNDULY CONCERNED ABOUT CHINESE OR VIETNAMESE ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL INSURGENTS. HE IS, HOWEVER, CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR INTENTIONS TOWARD THE DISPUTED SPRATLY ISLAND GROUP. THE GOP HAS SOUGHT TO FORTIFY ITS CLAIM BY BUILDING UP ITS MILITARY PRESENCE ON SELECTED ISLANDS IN THE GROUP AND BY EXPANDING ITS MILITARY CAPABILITY ON PALAWAN, THE NEAREST PHILIPPINE ISLAND. THE AFP'S DESIRE TO PURCHASE F-8 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT FROM THE US RESULTS IN PART FROM DESIRE TO BE ABLE TO PROTECT PHILIPPINE INTERESTS IN THE SPRATLYS FROM PALAWAN.

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B. EMBASSY'S ASSESSMENT OF THREAT CORRESPONDS WITH THAT OF GOP. ALTERNATIVES TO PRESENT GOP STRATEGY IN COUNTERING SUBVERSION HAVE LITTLE APPEAL FROM POINT OF VIEW OF MARCOS REGIME. HARDER MILITARY LINE WOULD BE COSTLY AND WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN MORE BLOODSHED WITHOUT RESOLUTION OF INSURGENCIES. MORE CONCILIATORY LINE UNLIKELY BECAUSE OF WIDE DIVERGENCE IN POSITIONS BETWEEN GOP AND INSURGENTS. WITH REGARD TO SPRATLYS, ALTERNATIVE COUSE OF NON-PURSUIT OF PHILIPPINE CLAIM PROBABLY DESIRABLE FROM US POINT OF VIEW TO AVOID POSSIBLE SITUATION IN WHICH WE MAY BE REQUESTED TO SUPPORT GOP IN REGIONAL CONFLICT. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE IT UNLIKELY GOP WILL BACK AWAY FROM SPRATLY CLAIM. B. GOP CONSIDERS US SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO BE QUID PRO QUO FOR MILITARY BASES. GOP ALSO BELIEVES US HAS OBLIGATION UNDER MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY TO PROTECT PHILIPPINES FROM EXTERNAL ATTACK AND, BY EXTENSION, TO ASSIST IN MAINTAINING PHILIPPINES DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES. UNWILLINGNESS ON OUR PART TO MEET AT LEAST SOME OF AFP'S REQUIREMENTS FOR EQUIPMENT

AND TRAINING WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT IT NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN US MILITARY BASES HERE, UNLESS WE WERE TO PROVIDE SOME MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATE FORM OF COMPENSATION. PHILIPPINES IS NOT VULNERABLE TO EXTERNAL AGRESSION AND, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE SPRATLY AREA, WE SEE MINIMAL DANGER THAT IN FUTURE HOSTILE NEIGHBORS MIGHT POSE EXTERNAL THREAT. HOWEVER, ANY OF SEVERAL

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NEIGHBORS COULD, IF HOSTILE TO PHILIPPINES, INCREASE SUBVERSION THREAT BY AIDING THE MUSLIM OR COMMUNIST INSURGENTS.

C. THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IS APPROPRIATE TO MEET THREATS OUTLINE ABOVE. A CIVILIAN SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE EXERCISES CONTROL THROUGH A JOINT GHQ OVER FOUR SERVICES, THE ARMY, POLICE CONSTABULARY, AIR FORCE, AND NAVY, WHICH INCLUDES COAST GUARD AND MARINE ELEMENTS. AFP STRENGTH HAS EXPANDED FAIRLY RAPIDLY SINCE 1972, BUT IS NOW ALMOST STABILIZED AT 140-150,000. UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WE SEE NO VALID REASONS FOR FURTHER INCREASES. THERE ARE ABOUT 60 AFP COMBAT BATTALIONS OF WHICH APPROXIMATELY 75 PERCENT ARE EMPLOYED IN MINDANAO. 40,000-MAN PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY WITH COMBINED POLICE-MILITARY ROLE IS CONCEPTUALLY SOUND FOR COUNTERING INTERNAL SUBVERSION. AFP EMPHASISES "SELF RELIANCE," I.E. LESSENING ITS DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE BY PRODUCING BASIC EQUIPMENT LOCALLY, BUT IN FACT IS FAR FROM ACHIEVING THIS IDEAL. AFP ON OCCASION

REQUESTS WEAPONRY NOT WELL SUITED FOR ITS REQUIREMENTS,  
E.G., DESTROYERS VICE PATROL BOATS, ADVANCED FIGHTER  
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VICE TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, BUT IS STILL BEHIND MOST OF  
ITS NEIGHBORS IN SOPHISTICATION OF MILITARY HARDWARE.  
THERE ARE NO COMPELLING REASONS WHY WE SHOULD CONTINUE  
TO DIRECTLY SUPPORT THE AFP. A MORE DESIRABLE ALTERNATIVE  
WOULD BE TO PHASE OUT MILITARY GRANT AID, ACCEDE TO THE  
PHILIPPINE DESIRE FOR CASH RENTAL FOR THE BASES, AND  
COMBINE THIS WITH A MAJOR LONG-TERM ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE  
PROJECT.

D. GOP IS LIKELY TO ACQUIRE THE FOLLOWING DEFENSE ARTICLES  
AND SERVICES FROM US IN FY 1979, IN PRIORITY ORDER:

ARTICLES	FMS MAP	FMS CASH	US CREDIT	COMMERCIAL
(DOLLARS IN MILLIONS)				
7 UH-1H HELICOPTERS		5.6		
1 C-130 AIRCRAFT		10.1		
35 F-8 AIRCRAFT		10.0		
OTHER AERO MODERNIZATION			3.8	
3 PATROL SHIPS (MULTI-MISSION)		20.0		
25 APC'S (M113A1)		1.5		
2 HOWITZERS (105MM .102)		0.2		
MISC. SMALL ARMS		6.2	0.6	
2 PATROL BOATS (65 FT. MK 3)		1.9		
SHIP SUPPORT		3.0		
NAVAL ORDNANCE		0.6		
WEAPONS				
OTHER NAVAL MODERNIZATION			8.5	2.0
AIRCRAFT SUPPORT		0.1		
COMMAND AND CONTROL		3.0	6.8	

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(COMMO, RADAR)				
GROUND MOBILITY (TRUCKS & TRAILERS)	2.9	14.1		3.5
MISCELLANEOUS SUPPORT EQUIPMENT		0.2	11.6	
MISCELLANEOUS SUPPLIES		0.1		
TOTAL	19.6	91.0	20.0	6.1

(NON-ADDITIVE)  
#LESS THAN \$50,000

AFP INTENDS USE ALL ABOVE ITEMS TO STANDARDIZE CURRENT INVENTORIES OR REPLACE OBSOLETE ITEMS. NONE OF ITEMS ARE SOPHISTICATED; IN MOST CASES GOP ACQUIRES OLDER FIRST OR SECOND GENERATION VERSIONS OF A GIVEN ITEM RATHER THAN LATEST, MOST ADVANCED VERSION. THERE ARE NO LESS ADVANCED OR LESS COSTLY ALTERNATIVES THAT WOULD BE MILITARILY ACCEPTABLE TO AFP. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO BE FORTHCOMING TO THE AFP AS LONG AS REQUESTS SEEM WELL THOUGHT OUT AND DESIRED ITEMS ARE NOT TOO SOPHISTICATED FOR AFP REQUIREMENTS. ALL THE ABOVE ITEMS MEET THESE CRITERIA.

E. WE DOUBT THAT ACQUISITION OF DEFENSE ARTICLES

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AND SERVICES LISTED ABOVE FROM US WILL HAVE ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON PHILIPPINE ECONOMY, DEBT-SERVICE CAPABILITY, OR DEVELOPMENT PLANS. (SEE REF B). GOP DEFENSE EXPENDITURES ARE WITHIN REASONABLE LIMITS (14.5 PERCENT OF GOVERNMENT BUDGET AND 2.7 PERCENT OF GNP) RELATIVE TO AVAILABLE RESOURCES. PHILIPPINE ARMED FORCES ACCOUNT FOR ONLY 1.3 PERCENT OF 1977 MALE LABOR FORCE. SINCE PHILIPPINE HAS SURPLUS OF UNSKILLED AND SEMI-SKILLED LABOR, THERE IS LITTLE OR NO COMPETITION FOR MANPOWER RESOURCES BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SECTORS, EXCEPT POSSIBLY IN CERTAIN PROFESSIONAL JOB CATEGORIES SUCH AS ENGINEERING. FY 1979

MILITARY IMPORTS WILL CONSTITUTE ROUGHLY 2.3 PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPORTS FOR THAT YEAR; FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESOURCES USED TO FINANCE MILITARY IMPORTS DO NOT CONSTITUTE MAJOR DRAIN ON AVAILABLE RESERVES. CONTRIBUTION OF MILITARY CREDITS TO OVERALL PHILIPPINE DEBT SERVICING REQUIREMENTS IS RELATIVELY MINOR. DEFENSE SPENDING, ALTHOUGH MODERATE, DOES OF COURSE CONSTITUTE DEMAND ON SCARCE GOP BUDGETARY RESOURCES. BY DIVERTING FUNDS FROM DEFENSE TO INFRASTRUCTURE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE GOP COULD FINANCE ALL THE PESO COSTS OF ROAD PROJECTS NOW BEING PROPOSED FOR FOREIGN FINANCING. HOWEVER, REDUCTIONS IN US SECURITY ASSISTANCE  
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WOULD ALMOST SURELY NOT RESULT IN EQUIVALENT REDUCTION IN GOP DEFENSE EXPENDITURES. THE GOP WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY SEEK TO ACQUIRE SOME SIMILAR DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES FROM THIRD COUNTRIES.

F. WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE MORE THAN A HANDFUL OF USG OR CIVILIAN CONTRACT PERSONNEL WILL BE REQUIRED IN PHILIPPINES IN FORESEEABLE FUTURE, AND WE FORESEE NO PROBLEMS IN THIS REGARD. BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS AND LACK OF EXTERNAL THREAT MAKE IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT GOP WILL SEEK TO PURCHASE LARGE QUANTITIES OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONRY REQUIRING PRESENCE OF FOREIGN CONTRACT PERSONNEL.

G. DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES COMPARABLE TO MOST OF THOSE WE HAVE BEEN PROVIDING AFP ARE AVAILABLE FROM THIRD COUNTRIES. IF US DENIES REQUEST, THERE IS GOOD LIKELIHOOD AFP WOULD ACQUIRE MOST ITEMS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. DURING PAST THREE TO FIVE YEARS WE HAVE IDENTIFIED AFP PURCHASES TALLING ALMOST \$40 MILLION FROM AT LEAST 11 COUNTRIES OTHER THAN US, INCLUDING ITALY, SINGAPORE, SPAIN, JAPAN, WEST GERMANY, PORTUGAL, ENGLAND, AUSTRALIA, BELGIUM, ISRAEL, AND TAIWAN.

H. ARMS CONTROL IMPACT OF MAJOR ANTICIPATED ARMS TRANSFERS TO GOP IS MINIMAL, OTHER COUNTRIES IN REGION, E.G., THE ASEAN NATIONS, TAIWAN, AND VIETNAM, HAVE COMPARABLE OR GREATER QUANTITIES, AND IN MANY INSTANCES MORE SOPHISTICATED TYPES, OF DEFENSE EQUIPMENT.

I. SINCE DEPARTMENT'S REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN PHILIPPINES TO HIRC IN LATE 1976 AND ADVENT OF CARTER ADMINISTRATION, GOP HAS MADE SIGNIFICANT EFFORT TO IMPROVE INTERNATIONAL AND PARTICULARLY US PERCEPTION OF  
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ITS HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD. MUCH OF EFFORT HAS BEEN COSMETIC, BUT THERE HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIVE IMPROVEMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION OVER LAST TWO MONTHS. AMONG MOTIVATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS PRESUMABLY HAS BEEN CONCERN THAT USG (ADMINISTRATION AND/OR CONGRESS) WOULD REDUCE OR ELIMINATE ASSISTANCE TO PHILIPPINES BECAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS MALPRACTICES. APPROVAL OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE REQUESTS WOULD PERHAPS REINFORCE GOP'S DETERMINATION CONTINUE IMPROVING SITUATION. DENIAL OF SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD NOT NECESSARILY, HOWEVER, RESULT IN DIMINUTION OF EFFORT OR DETERIORATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION. GOP'S RECENT PERFORMANCE IN HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD ALSO HAS BEEN IMPROVED BY REALIZATION INTER ALIA THAT ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS ALSO PREPARED APPLY HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLE WHEN DETERMINING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE LEVELS ON BOTH MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (WB, IMF, ADB, ETC.) AS WELL AS ON US BILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. GOP WILL CONTINUE TO REQUIRE THIS EXTERNAL ECONOMIC SUPPORT. THUS, EVEN SHOULD SECURITY ASSISTANCE BE TERMINATED ENTIRELY, IT IS IMPROBABLE THERE WOULD BE REGRESSION IN REGIME'S HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE OR SITUATION HERE, SINCE DIMINISHED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WHICH COULD RESULT FROM US (AND OTHERS) RESPONSE TO SUCH REGRESSION WOULD HAVE MORE PROFOUND NEGATIVE IMPACT ON PHILIPPINES

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AND REGIME'S STABILITY THAN MERE TERMINATION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE.

J. PROSPECTS APPEAR DIM FOR ENLISTING MUCH MORE THAN RHETORICAL GOP SUPPORT FOR ARMS RESTRAINT. GOP PERCEIVES SPECIFIC DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH ITS PLANS TO MODERNIZE THE AFP AND GIVES HIGH PRIORITY TO THESE NEEDS. APPREHENSION ON THE PART OF PRESIDENT PARCOS AND THE MILITARY THAT MINDANAO CEASEFIRE WILL NOT HOLD INDEFINITELY LENDS URGENCY TO THEIR DESIRE TO INSURE THAT AFP IS MILITARILY PREPARED FOR A RESUMPTION OF FIGHTING.

K. YOUNGER GENERATION OF MILITARY OFFICERS COMING TO THE FORE IS MORE NATIONALISTIC AND LESS US-ORIENTED THAN THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP. WE ARE ON RECORD AS FAVORING A BROADENING AND EXPANSION OF OUR TRAINING PROGRAM IN EFFORT TO OFFSET THIS TREND AND CULTIVATE PRO-US ATTITUDES (SEE MANILA 5905), ALTHOUGH SOME IN EMBASSY OPPOSE EXPANSION OF PROGRAM SINCE THEY BELIEVE IT TENDS TO IDENTIFY USG WITH VIEW THAT MARTIAL LAW A PERMANENT PHENOMENON  
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THEREBY CONTRIBUTING TO SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY (SEE MANILA 8130). INCREASED EMPHASIS ON PROFESSIONAL TRAINING, IN PARTICULAR TRAINING IN ADMINISTRATION MANAGEMENT, WOULD BE APPROPRIATE AND WELL RECEIVED. IF EQUIPMENT-RELATED TRAINING WERE NOT AVAILABLE FROM US ON GRANT BASIS, PHILIPPINES WOULD PROBABLY PURCHASE LIMITED (AND SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED FROM CURRENT LEVELS) AMOUNTS OF TRAINING USING FMS FINANCING. GOP RECENTLY PURCHASED FOR THE FIRST TIME PROFESSIONAL TRAINING FOR ONE OFFICER WITH FMS. UNDER ARRANGEMENTS NOW BEING WORKED OUT GOP WILL IN FUTURE PAY ROUND TRIP TRAVEL COSTS TO US FOR TRAINING WHILE IMET PAYS PER DIEM AND CONUS TRAVEL COSTS.  
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## Message Attributes

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**Disposition Date:** 22 May 2009  
**Disposition Event:**  
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**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** ASSESSMENT OF US SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR FY 1979: THE PHILIPPINES  
**TAGS:** MASS, RP, XX, US  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
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